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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/appellee,

:

v.

:

CLARENCE J. FRANKLIN

:

Case No. 960161-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1995) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the elements of
aggravated assault and threatening with or using a dangerous
weapon are different and not wholly duplicative?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue involves the trial court's legal conclusions,
which are reviewed for correctness and afforded no deference.
State v. Vocrt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1995);
76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995):
76-5-103. Aggravated Assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995):
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in
fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self-defense in the
presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any
dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In a February 9, 1995 information, the State charged
defendant, Clarence J. Franklin, with aggravated assault, a third
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degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995)
(R. 06). After a trial on October 17 and 18, 1995, a jury
convicted defendant of the charged offense (R. 106) . On March 4,
1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to zerc-to-five years
in prison and a $5,000.00 fine (R. 118). The trial court stayed
the sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years
with the provision that defendant spend one year in jail and pay
full restitution and a fine of $1,000.00 (R. 118). Defendant
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 11, 1996 (R. 120).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault for
pointing a gun at the victim's chest, from about four feet away,
and threatening to kill him.

The following details are recited

in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

See State v.

Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996); State v. Winward. 907 P.2d
1188, 1189 (Utah App. 1995).
On February 7, 1995, at about 9:00 p.m., David Golder and
Joshua Nielson exited the Fashion Place Mall to see a stranger
rummaging through Golder's 1987 Jeep, which was parked
approximately 70 feet from the mall entrance (R. 228-29, 242,
245).

Golder shouted at the stranger and asked him what he was

doing in the Jeep (R. 230, 245-46).
3

The stranger, who was

accompanied by another person unknown to Golder, responded by
exclaiming, uWe didn't steal it. We didn't steal it.

The guys

in the blue truck did." (R. 230, 264). Golder looked in his Jeep
to discover that his stereo, portable CD player, and some CDs
were gone (R. 231, 264).
Golder accused the strangers of stealing the missing items,
but they persisted that they had not, blaming the theft on "some
kid in a blue Mazda truck." (R. 264-65, 230). The strangers then
invited Golder and Nielson to look through their own car for the
stolen items (R. 231, 264-65).
Golder and Nielson had just begun to look in the windows of
the other car, when a blue Mitsubishi pick-up truck driven by
Justin Sparacino pulled up (R. 232-233, 265, 295, 311).
Defendant sat in the passenger seat with the window down (233,
234, 235, 278, 266, 311). Golder approached the passenger side
of the truck and began demanding his "stuff" back (R. 234, 266,
315) .
As Golder approached, defendant pointed a large gun at
Golder and said "Fuck you, mother fucker.
will kill you right now."

You ain't shit. I

(R. 236-37, 267-68).

Because Golder

initially thought the gun was a toy, he kept advancing (R. 237).
As Golder neared, however, he realized that the gun was real (R.
4

237).

Defendant next pointed the gun at Nielson, who had run up

behind Golder, and repeated, "I will kill you.
mother fucker."

You ain't shit,

(R. 267).

As Golder came closer, defendant opened the door, stepped
out and pointed the gun directly at Golder's chest, which was
only one to four feet away (R. 256, 269, 278-79).

Defendant then

retreated into the truck, which raced off (R. 269, 303). Golder
and Nielson took down the truck's license plate and immediately
drove to the police station to report the incident (R. 260,
269) .
Meanwhile, Sparacino and defendant returned to Sparacino's
home where they parked the truck and left with a friend (R. 3 0405, 318). They returned to find police speaking with Sparacino's
mother, the owner of the truck (R. 305, 319, 334). Sparacino
walked up and said, "How is it going, Mrs. Sparacino?" (R. 335).
One of the officers recognized Sparacino from a photograph that
Mrs. Sparacino had showed him (R.

335). The officer kidded

Sparacino about his statement and Sparacino finally admitted who
he was (R. 335). Officers interviewed Sparacino and defendant
separately (R. 335-37, 341). Sparacino admitted to having been
in the truck that night, but denied having driven to Fashion
Place Mall (R. 336) . Defendant, on the other hand, denied that
5

he had even been in the blue truck that evening or that he had
been to the mall (R. 337). Both Sparacino and defendant changed
their stories at trial and testified that they had driven to the
Fashion Place Mall in the blue truck that night, but denied that
defendant had pointed a gun at Golder or threatened him (R. 30306, 318) .
At trial, after the State rested its case-in-chief,
defendant moved to reduce the charge from aggravated assault to
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or
quarrel on the ground that the two crimes proscribed the same
conduct but carried different penalties (R. 285-86).

The court

denied defendant's motion, concluding that the elements of the
two crimes were not identical (R. 291). The court did determine,
however, that under the facts presented, defendant was entitled
to have a jury instruction on using a dangerous weapon in a fight
or quarrel as a lesser included offense (R. 292). Despite the
lesser included offense instruction, the jury convicted defendant
of aggravated assault (R. 89-93, 106),
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Defendant is not entitled to a reduction of his penalty
under State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), because the
elements of aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous
6

weapon are not identical.

Specifically, aggravated assault

requires the making of a threat to do bodily harm, whereas
threatening with a weapon does not.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE CRIMES OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND THREATENING
WITH OR USING A DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT OR
QUARREL DO NOT SHARE IDENTICAL ELEMENTS.
THEREFORE, STATE V, SHONDEL DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS
CASE.
Relying on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969),
defendant argues that the trial court erred in not reducing his
conviction for third degree felony aggravated assault to
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or
quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

Defendant bases his argument on

the assertion that the elements of aggravated assault as charged
in this case are the same as those of threatening with a
dangerous weapon.
Under Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes proscribe the
same crime but assess different penalties, the defendant is
entitled to receive the lesser penalty.

Shondelr 453 P.2d at

147; see alSQ State V, Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985);
State V, QQmZ, 722 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Utah 1986); State v. Clark.
632 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981); State v. Verdin. 595 P.2d 862,
7

862 (Utah 1979); see also State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah
App. 1991) . Otherwise, the exact same conduct would be ''subject
to different penalties depending upon which of two statutory
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge."
263.

Bryan. 709 P.2d at

That would violate a defendant's right to equal protection

under the laws.

Id. at 263; see Clark. 632 P.2d at 843-44.

The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative
as to the elements of the crime."

Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263. If

the elements of the crimes are not identical and the two statutes
require "some proof of some fact or element not required to
establish the other," they do not proscribe the same conduct and
the defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more
severe penalty.

Clark. 632 P.2d at 844.

In this case, the trial court properly refused to
reduce the charges against defendant because the crimes of
aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous weapon do not
share identical elements.

The Utah Code defines aggravated

assault as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
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(b) under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of Subsection 1(a), uses a dangerous weapon

as defined in Section 7S-1-6Q1 or another means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second
degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree
felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (emphasis added).

Defendant was

charged under subsection (1)(b), therefore, to be guilty of
aggravated assault, defendant had to commit an assault by using a
dangerous weapon.

Assault is

(a) an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat. accompanied by show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another: or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes or creates a substantial risk or bodily
injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (1995) (emphasis added).

Thus, the

elements the State needed to prove for aggravated assault in this
case were that 1) defendant made a threat to do bodily injury to
another, 2) the threat was accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, and 3) the defendant used a dangerous weapon.
In contrast, threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in
a fight or quarrel is defined as
Every person . . . who not in necessary selfdefense in the presence of two or more persons, draws
or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry or
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threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995).

Thus, to be guilty of

threatening with a dangerous weapon, the defendant must 1) draw
or exhibit a dangerous weapon 2) in an angry or threatening way
or manner 3) in the presence of two or more persons 4) not in
necessary self-defense, or the defendant must unlawfully use a
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel.

Since defendant did not

actually use, but merely pointed, the gun, only the first four
elements are at issue in this case.
Ignoring controlling precedent, defendant asserts that
making a threat to do bodily injury with a dangerous weapon is
the same as showing a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening
manner.

The Utah Supreme Court, however, has recognized that

there is a qualitative difference between intentionally making a
threat to harm someone with a gun and merely exhibiting a
dangerous weapon in a threatening manner.

State v. Verdin. 595

P.2d at 862. The defendant in Verdin was convicted of aggravated
assault.

Like the defendant in this case, Verdin argued that the

elements of aggravated assault were the same as those of
threatening with a dangerous weapon and that he was entitled to
the lesser penalty.

Id.

The Court summarily rejected that
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argument, observing that the "distinctions in levels of
proscribed conduct are clear and easily to be comprehended."

Id.

The Court pointed out that the evidence in that case established
all the elements of aggravated assault/ i.e., that
Verdin aimed a deadly1 weapon, a loaded rifle, at a
police officer, worked the action to put a shell into
the firing chamber, and attempted to pull the trigger
while declaring his intention to "smoke" the officer.

This is quite a different and more reprehensible course
of action than exhibiting a dangerous weapon in a
threatening manner.
Id. at 863 (emphasis added, except for the word "deadly" which
was emphasized in the original).
The differences between the two crimes was also acknowledged
in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984).

In that

case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant, who was
charged with aggravated assault, was entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction of threatening with a dangerous
weapon.

Id.

The Court pointed out that to prove defendant

committed aggravated assault, the State had to show that
defendant assaulted the officer with a deadly weapon "with the

*At the time Verdin was decided aggravated assault required
the use of a "deadly" weapon as opposed to a "dangerous" weapon
required in the current version of the statute. Any distinction
between a "deadly" and a "dangerous" weapon is insignificant for
purposes of this case and did not form the basis for the Court's
decision in Verdin. See Verdin, 595 P.2d at 862-63.
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intention to do bodily harm."

Id.

Threatening with a dangerous

weapon, on the hand, required only the exhibiting of a dangerous
weapon in an angry or threatening manner.

Id.

The Court

concluded that because there was evidence that "clearly negated a
threat by defendant to do bodily harm" the jury could have
acquitted defendant of aggravated assault and convicted him of
the lesser offense of threatening with a weapon.

Id. at 555.

Implicit in that ruling is the recognition that aggravated
assault requires a threat to do bodily harm, while threatening
with a dangerous weapon does not.
In sum, threatening with a dangerous weapon does not require
a defendant to make a threat to do bodily injury to another.
Rather, the defendant need only display a dangerous weapon in a
way that is angry or threatening.

Thus, the defendant may be

guilty of threatening with a weapon even though there is no
threat made or intended.

Aggravated assault, on the other hand,

requires that a threat of bodily injury be made.

As the Utah

Supreme Court recognized, there is a real difference between
waving or merely exhibiting a gun in an angry or threatening way
and intentionally pointing a gun and uttering a threat to do
bodily injury.

Verdin. 595 P.2d at 863; Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at

554-555.
12

In this case, defendant expressly threatened to kill Golder
and Nielson and backed up his threat by pointing a gun at them
(R. 236-37; 267-68).

While, it is arguable under these facts

that defendant could have been found guilty of threatening Golder
with a dangerous weapon in that he exhibited the gun in a
threatening manner, defendant also did something not required by
the threatening with a dangerous weapon statute:

he

intentionally threatened Golder and Nielson with bodily injury.
That crucial element of aggravated assault is what distinguishes
the crime of aggravated assault from the crime of threatening
with a dangerous weapon.
Because the elements of aggravated assault and threatening
with a weapon are not identical, they do not proscribe the same
conduct and Shondel does not apply to this case.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that the elements of
aggravated assault differed significantly from the elements of
threatening with a dangerous weapon and properly refused to
reduce defendant's charges.

The State therefore respectfully

requests the Court to affirm defendant's conviction of aggravated
assault.

13

//*>

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this II ~ day of March, 1997
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

ti^/D- / L W ^ 4 :
iaura B. Dupaix
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mailed,
postage prepaid, to Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake Legal
Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
UT 84111, this /' ~ day of March, 1997.

/^ytU^J^/D. L><^p<z<c<%;

14

